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A Reconsideration of the role of forward-market 
arbitrage in Keynes’s and Hicks’s theories of the term 
structure of interest rates 
Lucy Brillant 
 
“It is these professional investors, operating upon the whole gamut, and paying close attention 
to small differences in rates, who provide most of the logic of the interest system.” (Hicks, 1939a, 
p.169) 
“The long rate is an average, not of expected short rates, but of forward short rates, which equal 
expected rates plus a risk premium.” (Hicks, 1939a, p.281) 
 
 
Abstract:  
This paper develops the relationship between Hicks’s and Keynes’s writings on the theory of 
the term structure of interest rates, and shows in detail how Hicks built on and extended 
Keynes’s account. According to this theory, the level of the long-term interest rate is 
determined by expectations of future short-term rates. Keynes’s thinking contained several 
notions – such as the preferred habitat of lenders, the theory of forward markets, and risk-
premiums – which Hicks used to give a more complete theory of the term structure of interest 
rates. Besides implementing these notions in his own theory, Hicks introduced the concepts 
of the preferred habitat of borrowers, the liquidity risk premium, and arbitrageurs who can 
take advantage of spreads between spot and forward rates and eliminate risk premiums. 
 
Key words: arbitrageurs, borrowers, forward rates, expected short-term rates, lenders, risk 
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 1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the working of the term structure of interest rates in John Maynard 
Keynes’s and John Richard Hicks’s theory. Keynes provided a first version in his Treatise on 
Money (1930) and a second in The General Theory (1936). Hicks, influenced by Keynes, 
elaborated his theory a few years later in Value and Capital (1939a). In these author’s thought, 
operations of arbitrage and preferred habitats determine the term structure of interest rates. 
It is worth precising that neither Keynes nor Hicks used the term of “preferred habitat” per se. 
Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch labelled this theory in 1966. However, as we shall see, 
the concept of preferred habitat is part of Keynes’s and Hicks’s theories. Hicks’s theory has 
been extensively tested empirically from the sixties to nowadays by David Meiselman (1962), 
Modigliani and Sutch (1966), Rainer Masera (1972), Dimitri Vayanos and Jean-Luc Vila (2009) 
and Robin Greenwood and Vayanos (2010). Some refer to the “expectation theory”, others to 
the “liquidity-risk premium model” (Cultbertson, 1957; Malkiel, 1967, p.17 and p.24; 
Meiselman, 1962, p.45; Modigliani and Sutch, 1966, p.182; Masera, 1972, p.17; Bisière, 1994, 
p.32). This literature utilizes Hicks framework without attributing to him and Keynes the 
elaboration of the preferred habitat notion, and the role of arbitrageurs (in addition to primary 
lenders and borrowers). The paper intends to rebuild Hicks’s theory, inspired by Keynesian 
concepts, to promote their contributions which impacted so much the contemporary 
literature. 
 
The second part of our research focuses on Keynes’s theory of the term structure of interest 
rates. In a Treatise on Money Keynes wrote that short-term rates of interest can be 
transmitted to long term rates of interest1. This connection is rendered possible thanks to the 
operations of arbitrageurs. This theory can be assimilated to what the actual literature calls 
the “Pure Expectations Theory”. When agents expect with certainty the future course of short-
term rates of interest, the long-term rate is equal to the average of current and expected 
 
1 Donald Moggridge and Susan Howson (1974, pp.234-235) explain that Keynes is one of the first thinkers to 
consider a relation between interest rates of different terms. One anonymous referee suggested quoting Irving 
Fisher’s contributions to the theory of the term structure of interest rates (1896, 1906, and 1930). However, 
because neither Keynes nor Hicks refer to Fisher, we prefer not integrating his theory in this paper. 
short/spot rates of interest. The central bank can influence the long-term rates by influencing 
short term rates. In the context of certainty, Hicks’s theory reaches the same conclusion than 
Keynes. However, Keynes’s and Hicks’s view on the connection between interest rates differ 
in a context of uncertainty. 
 
The third part deals with the risk of liquidity affecting bonds’ holders that Keynes introduces 
in The General Theory (1936). Because of this risk, lenders prefer buying short-dated 
securities, i.e. they have a short-term preferred habitat. The risk premium on long-term bonds 
is ascribed to lenders’ short-term preferred habitat. As explained by Culbertson (1957, p.486), 
Keynes extended his theory of the term structure in the General Theory (1936) to explain the 
situations of liquidity trap (i.e. when long-term rates do not respond to movements of short-
term rates). If arbitrageurs are reluctant to buy bonds, the level of the long-term rate would 
reflects a risk premium2. In this situation, the monetary policy cannot hope to influence long-
term rates. 
 
The fourth part is about Hicks’s theory of the term structure of interest rates. Hicks criticizes 
the way Keynes determines the risk premium on loan markets, and wrote that Keynes’s theory 
of the term structure “hang[s] by its own bootstraps”. Hicks gives another theory of the term 
structure of interest rates. In his theory, Hicks applies the Keynesian theory of forward 
markets for commodities to the loan market. Hicks’s main point is that long-term rates of 
interest depend on the liquidity preferences of both lenders and borrowers on loans market. 
Furthermore, the term structure of interest rates is determined by the supply of and demand 
for long and short term securities by primary borrowers and lenders. The upward sloping 
shape of the term structure of interest is due to the preferred habitat of lenders and 
borrowers. 
 
The fifth part sheds light on the role of ‘professional investors’ in Hicks’s theory. In his article 
The term structure of interest rates (1957), Culbertson explains that “ ‘arbitrages’ of dealers 
and professional investors [are] an important factor affecting the behaviour of the term 
 
2 Looking for solutions to stir the economy from the depression, Keynes underlined the limits to the monetary 
policies and arbitrages. Hicks provided as well interesting elements on this issue. We emphasize this side of 
Keynes’s and Hicks’s thoughts in a separate paper entitled “Limits to arbitrage and interest rates: a debate 
between Hawtrey, Hicks and Keynes” (Brillant, 2015) 
structure” (1957, p.499). We observe however that the literature of the 60’s does not refer to 
Hicks’s contribution to arbitrage. As we shall see, in Hicks, “professional investors” are 
arbitrageurs who “operat[e] on the whole gamut and pa[y] close attention to small differences 
in rates” (Hicks, 1939a, p.169). They are the counterpart of hedgers (lenders and borrowers), 
and they can be more willing to take risks than common lenders on the market for long term 
maturities. Arbitrageurs, as we shall see, are important in Hicks’s theory, because they 
“provide most of the logic of the system of interest rates” (Hicks, 1939a, p.169). The sixth part 
concludes. 
 
2. The term structure of interest rates in certainty 
 
When agents expect with certainty future short-term rates of interest, the level of the 
long-term rate of interest reaches the average of expected short-term rates3. This is stressed 
by Keynes in A Treatise on Money (1930). In this book, there is already the notion of liquidity 
 
3 The reader can refer to de Boyer (2002, p.198), where there is a short discussion about the term structure of 
interest rates in a context of certainty only, without incorporating risk-premiums 
preference developed six years later in The General Theory. Keynes is convinced, in 1930, of a 
connection between short-term and long-term rates of interest: 
 
… experience shows that, as a rule, the influence of the short-term rate of interest on the long-
term rate is much greater than anyone who argued on the above lines would have expected. 
(Keynes, 1930, II p.316) 
 
Keynes supports his theory with a graph made by economist Winfield Riefler4. The graph 
illustrates a relation between short and long-term rates of interest from 1919 to 1928 in the 
United States5: 
 
 
(Keynes, 1930, II, p.317) 
 
Short and long-term rates of interest are connected thanks to the operations of arbitrageurs 
– such as “banks, insurance offices, investment trusts, finance houses, etc.” (Keynes, 1930, II, 
p.320): 
 
In the modern world the volume of long-term borrowing for purposes of new 
investment depends most directly on the attitude of the leading issue houses and 
 
4 Donald Moggridge (1992, p.582) writes that Keynes and Riefler, a Fed economist, met in New York in the 
Twenties. 
5 “The long-term rates are measured by the average yield of sixty high-grade bonds, and the short-term rates by 
a weighted average of various typical short-term rates.” (Keynes, 1930, II, p.316). The curve representing the 
short-term rate is higher than curve representing the long term rate because the short-term rate contains a 
credit risk. 
underwriters, who act as middlemen between the ultimate borrowers and lenders. 
(Keynes, 1930, II, p.329-330) 
 
We can illustrate the connection of interest rate to which Keynes refers with the following 
example: 
 
Case [1]: 
 
Assume the following hypothesis: if the current rate for a one-year loan and the expected 
short-term rates for a one-year loan in a year’s time are r1 =1% and 𝑟"# = 1%	then the long-
term rate for a two-year loan R2=1%, where this last rate is given by the following formula: 𝑅" = [(1 + 𝑟,)(1 + 𝑟"#)],/" − 1. If arbitrageurs expect a fall of expected short-term rates 
from 1% to 0.65%, the long-term rate of interest 𝑅" will be 0.825%. Thus, the long-term rate 
of interest will fall from 1% to 0.825%. The mechanism explaining the fall of the long-term rate 
of interest is the following: if arbitrageurs expect a fall of the rate payable on short-term loans 
(called by Keynes a “bullish” feeling on bond markets), the long-term rate of interest will fall 
because arbitrageurs will supply short-term debts and will demand long-term bonds; there 
will be an excess demand for bonds on markets.  Inversely, if arbitrageurs expect a rise of the 
rate payable on short-term loans (“bearish” feelings) (from 1% to 𝑟"# = 2%), 𝑅" = 1.498%; the 
long-term rate of interest will rise from 1% to 1.498%. 
This theory is significant à propos the possibility for a central bank to influence the 
determination of long term interest rate through its short term rate policy6. In a context of 
certainty, if the central bank announces a reduction of the short-term rate 𝑟, to 0,25%, the 
long term rate 𝑅" will drop to: 
ü 𝑅" = 0.25% if the CB announces that, in 𝑡", it will put the rate 𝑟" to 0,25% 
ü  𝑅" = 0.37% if the CB announces that, in 𝑡", it will put the rate 𝑟" to 0,5% 
ü 𝑅" = 0.62% if the CB announces that, in 𝑡", it will put the rate 𝑟" to 1% 
Reciprocally, in the context of uncertainty about the level of r2 in t2, the efficiency of monetary 
policy to influence the determination of the long term interest rate could be weak. If this case 
happens, it means that the central bank’s announcement is not credible (Keynes, 1930)7. Or 
 
 
6 We suppose that this passage deals with the term structure of interest rate as a monetary phenomenon »   
7 Cf. de Boyer (2003, p.202-204). 
“if interest-expectations are rigidly inelastic” (Hicks, 1939a, p.260)8. However, in this paper we 
do not discuss these special cases9. Instead, we focus on the term structure of interest rates 
that Keynes provides in his Treatise on Money (1930) and then in The General Theory (1936), 
and Hicks contributions a few years later in Value and Capital (1939a). The formation of a risk 
premium is a consequence of the uncertainty on future short term rates of interest, as it is 
developed in the next parts. 
In a controversy with Ralph G. Hawtrey, Hicks endorses, like Keynes, the existence of agents 
who arbitrate between short and long-term maturities and also a connection between interest 
rates: 
 
… short and long loans are closely similar things, and one would expect to find them being close 
substitutes for important classes of borrowers and lenders… That hypothesis would explain why 
short and long rates should tend to rise and fall together… (Hicks, 1939c, p.154) 
 
Hicks explains, like Keynes again, that agents’ expectations of the future short term rates of 
interest determine the long term rate of interest:  
 
… if high or low money rates are expected to continue for a long period, the price of consols 
expected to rule in the future will be affected by the continuance-and the present price of 
consols will be affected much more than it could have been affected by a change in short rates 
which was not expected to continue for long (Hicks, 1939b, p.26) 
 
Following Keynes, Hicks (1939a, p.145) also studies the term structure of interest rates in a 
context of certainty. However Hicks refers to forward rates (𝑟𝑓)10, (which are expected rates 
plus a risk premium, as we shall see in the third part of this paper): 
 
The long rate is an average, not of expected short rates, but of forward short rates… (Hicks, 
1939a, footnote, p.281) 
 
Forward short rates are rates decided at date t1 for a loan delivered at date t2. 
 However, in a context of certainty, forward rates are equal to expected short-term rates: 𝑟𝑓, = 𝑟"#. Therefore, Hicks reaches the same conclusion as Keynes: when expectations are 
 
8 A referee underlines that Hicks also introduces this elasticity hypothesis which deals with the inefficiency of 
monetary policy. 
9 “The effectiveness of the rate of interest as a stabilizer depends not only upon the extent to which changes in 
short rates are transmitted to long rates (a point about which we cannot be very optimistic)…” (Hicks, 1939a, 
p.262). This interesting topic is the purpose of the next chapter of my thesis, “Limits to arbitrage and interest 
rates, a controversy between Hawtrey, Hicks and Keynes”. 
10 « …forward short rates: rates for loans of one week, to be executed not in the current week, but in some future 
week. » (Hicks, 1939a, p. 146-147) 
perfect, the long term rate of interest is equal to the average of expected short term rates 
(Hicks, 1939a, p.145). This relation can be represented for two periods as follow: 𝑅" = [(1 + 𝑟,)(1 + 𝑟𝑓,)],/" − 1  
However, as we will see in the third part of our paper, Hicks disagrees with Keynes on the 
relation between interest rates in a context of uncertainty, and more specifically on the 
determination of the risk premium and arbitrages. 
 
3. Keynes’s risk-premium 
 
In 1936, Keynes introduces elements of risk in the theory of the term structure of 
interest rates11. In a context of uncertainty, lenders on bond markets do not expect perfectly 
“the complex of rates of interest for varying maturities which will rule at future dates...” 
(Keynes, 1936, p.168). This uncertainty leads lenders to have what Modigliani and Sutch call a 
“short-term preferred habitat”12. It means that when there is equality of return between long-
term and short-term loans, lenders prefer lending on the short-term. This idea is briefly 
expounded in 1930, but Keynes does not give much emphasis to this: “Now banks above all 
prefer short-term assets if they can afford them.” (Keynes, 1930, II, p.321). He does not give 
in his Treatise a theory explaining these preferences; he does in The General Theory. Lenders 
have a short-term preferred habitat because they are affected by a “risk of a loss” (Keynes, 
1936, p.168-169), or a “risk of disappointment” (Keynes, 1936, p.169) when investing in long-
term loans. If a lender needs cash before the date of maturity of a loan, and exchanges the 
 
11 Culbertson notices a change in Keynes’s thought from a Treatise on Money to the General Theory: “In the 
General Theory, however, in recognition of the reluctance of long-term rates to decline in the 1930’s, he [Keynes] 
abandoned his doctrine.” (Culbertson, 1957, p.486) 
12 These authors elaborated a model in which the term structure of interest rates is determined by agents’ 
expectations and the distribution of preferred habitats. In their model, they relax the Hicksian assumption that 
lenders have a short-term preferred habitat and borrowers’ a long-term one. 
bond against cash before maturity, there is a risk of a loss because market rates may have 
risen since the time the investment was made: 
 
Thus if a need for liquid cash may conceivably arise before the expiry of n years, there is a risk 
of a loss being incurred in purchasing a long-term debt and subsequently turning it into cash, as 
compared with holding cash. (Keynes, 1936, p.168-169) 
 
Considering this risk affecting long-term lenders, an excess return prevails on long-term loans. 
Arbitrageurs can thus make a profit: 
 
If the running yield on bonds is greater than the rate payable on 
short-term loans, a profit is obtainable by borrowing short in order to carry long-term securities, 
so long as the latter do not actually fall in value during the currency of the loan. Thus the 
pressure of transactions of this kind will initiate an upward trend, and this, for a time at least, 
will confirm the investor in a 'bullish' feeling towards the bond market. (Keynes, 1930, II, p.319-
320) 
 
 A higher nominal rate of return – or risk-premium13 – must offset the “risk of disappointment” 
(Keynes, 1936, p.169) being a rise of long term market rates of interest. The risk-premium 
depends on arbitrageurs’ expectations on future rates of interest. If a majority of arbitrageurs 
expect bond prices to fall – a bearish sentiment prevails on bond markets –, they will stay in 
their short-term preferred-habitat. In this passage, Keynes defines the risk-premium 
prevailing on long term loans as: 
 
The actuarial profit or mathematical expectation of gain calculated in accordance with the 
existing probabilities – if it can be so calculated, which is doubtful – must be sufficient to 
compensate for the risk of disappointment. (Keynes, 1936, p.169). 
 
Therefore, the long-term rate of interest is the average of current and expected short-term 
rates plus a risk premium. The long-term rate of interest in Keynes’s theory can be presented 
as follow: 𝑅" = [(1 + 𝑟,+∝)(1 + 𝑟"#+∝)],/" − 1               
Where α is Keynes’s risk-premium. 
Hicks disagrees with the way Keynes determines the risk premium. Indeed, Hicks explains that 
in The General Theory, the long-term rate of interest is determined partly by expected short-
term rates and by a risk-premium (α), which is itself determined by expectations on future 
 
13 Inversely, a liquidity-premium is the non-excess return prevailing on short-term assets. Keynes defines it in 
1936 as: “The amount (measured in term of itself) which they are willing to pay for the potential convenience or 
security given by this power of disposal (exclusive of yield or carrying cost attaching to the asset), we shall call its 
liquidity-premium l.” (Keynes, 1936, p.226) 
interest rates. This is what leads Hicks to write that Keynes’s theory of the term structure of 
interest rates “hang[s] by its own bootstraps”14: 
 
… to say that the rate of interest on perfectly safe securities is determined by nothing else but 
uncertainty of future interest rates seems to leave interest hanging by its own bootstraps; one 
feels an obstinate conviction that there must be more in it than that. Let us try to discover what 
that something more can be. (Hicks, 1939a, p.164) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Hicks’s risk premium and the preferred habitat of borrowers 
 
Hicks’s theory is different from Keynes’s one. Indeed, by applying the theory of the 
forward markets on the loan market, Hicks determines the risk premium in another way than 
Keynes. Also, before the operation of arbitrages, the term structure of interest rates is upward 
sloping in Hicks’s theory because of a “constitutional weakness” on loans markets which come 
from the demand for/ supply of short-term and long-term loans from primary lenders and 
borrowers. Then, it is determines by arbitrageurs’ expectations on future short-rates (called 
“professional investors”, as studied in the fourth part of this paper). Whereas in Keynes’s, the 
long-term rate exceeds this average either if arbitrageurs expect a rise of these short rates, or 
if arbitrageurs do not want to buy bonds by borrowing at the decreasing short rate. 
 Hicks applies Keynes’s theory of the forward market15 on the term structure of interest 
rates. This has been already explained by Meiselman (1962, p.12-13), Gordon Malkiel (1967, 
p.24-25), Masera (1972, p.18 and Christophe Bisière (1994, p.33). On commodity markets, 
there is a spread between forward prices – prices decided in date t for commodities delivered 
at date t+1 – and expected spot prices – the expected price of commodities decided and 
delivered at date t+1. This theory is developed in A Treatise on Money (1930): 
 
If supply and demand are balanced, the spot price must exceed the forward price by the amount 
which the producer is ready to sacrifice in order to ‘hedge’ himself, i.e. to avoid the risk of price 
 
14 Like Meiselman (1962, p.30), we consider that this passage deals with the term structure of interest rate as a 
monetary phenomenon. 
15 Keynes studied the theory of forward markets on the commodity markets called the “organized markets for 
staple raw materials” (Keynes, 1930, II, p.127). Luca Fantacci, Maria Cristina Marcuzzo and Eleonora Sanfilippo 
(2010) wrote an article on this side of Keynes’s thought. 
fluctuations during his production period. Thus in normal conditions the spot price exceeds the 
forward price, i.e. there is a backwardation. (Keynes, 1930, II, p.128). 
 
This spread is due to the behavior of producers of goods. These producers want to hedge their 
sales. Indeed, they prefer selling at a forward price instead of selling at an uncertain expected 
spot price. The excess supply of forward contracts in comparison with the demand explains 
why forward prices are lower than expected spot prices.  
 
… they [the hedgers] know that the demands and supplies which can be fixed up in advance for 
any particular date may have little relation to the demands and supplies which will actually be 
forthcoming at that date … (Hicks, 1939a, p.137). 
 
An analogy has to be made, according to Hicks, on loan markets. Borrowers on loan markets 
are hedgers. They prefer borrowing at the forward rate – the expected short-rate of interest 
fixed in the present for a loan to be executed at a future date – instead of renewing their loan 
at uncertain short/spot interest rates. By hedging forward, they avoid the risk and uncertainty 
of a rise of spot rates of interest. Borrowers have a long-term preferred habitat: 
 
They may be embarking on operations which take a considerable time to come to fruition; or 
they may merely be laying down plans for continuous production, in the form of a long series of 
planned inputs and outputs, which it will not be easy to break off at any particular point. These 
persons will want to hedge their future supplies of loan capital, just as they will want to hedge 
their future supplies of raw materials. They will have a strong propensity to borrow long… Many 
borrowers would desire the additional security that comes of borrowing for longer periods. 
(Hicks, 1939a, p.146-150) 
 
Because of borrowers’ preferred habitat, there is an excess supply of forward loans in 
comparison with the forward demand of lenders. Borrowers must attract lenders by paying 
higher rates: 
 
Borrowers would thus tend to offer better terms in order to persuade lenders to switch over 
into the long market (that is to say, enter the forward market)… (Hicks, 1939a, p.148) 
 
On the other hand, on loan market, there is an excess demand for short-term loans. Like 
Keynes, Hicks explained that it comes from the short-term preferred-habitat of lenders16: 
 
As soon as a lender begins to envisage the possibility that he may want his capital back in 
conceivable cases – and it is hard to believe that this idea is ever wholly absent – the drawback 
 
16 Hicks explains also that lenders can have a long-term preferred habitat. Indeed, the size of a class of lender 
who prefer long-dated securities is an empirical question: “On the other side, there may be a certain class of 
lenders who would be content with indefinite lending - those whose object is simply to derive a regular income 
of indefinitely long lending begins to be evident. As we have seen, the rate of interest which can 
be earned on a loan of any finite duration, by investing in undated debentures, is always highly 
conjectural. If there is a serious rise in the long-term rate of interest, the effective yield may be 
completely wiped out. (Hicks, 1939a, p.151) 
 
As Keynes, Hicks emphasized a connection between interest rates. But Hicks put an emphasis 
on forward rates: 
 
The long rate is the arithmetic average between the current short rate and the relevant forward 
short rates. (Hicks, 1939a, p.145) 
 
Because lenders and borrowers have a preferred-habitat leading to an excess supply of long 
term bonds, forward rates are higher than expected spot/short rates. Hicks characterized this 
situation as a “normal backwardation”. Indeed, he explained that in normal time the loan 
market is characterized by an excess supply of forward loans in comparison with the demand. 
He makes here the assumption that there is an excess supply of long-term debt on loans 
 
from their capital, and have no thought of anything else. How large this class is can be disputed (broad historical 
movements may well have changed its size very drastically); nevertheless, in any circumstances the qualification 
- they have no thought of anything else - is important.” (Hicks, 1939, p.151). 
markets. Because lenders prefer investing in short-dated securities, there is a weakness on 
the demand side for long-dated securities: 
 
… in all forward markets there is likely to be a tendency for hedgers to predominate on one side 
or the other over long periods. (Hicks, 1939a, p.138fn) 
 
Borrowers expect future short/spot rates, but decide to issue bonds at the forward rate. There 
is therefore an excess offer of forward contract. The forward short rate is thus higher than the 
expected short rate. According to Hicks, this spread is a “risk-premium”: 
 
The forward short rate will thus exceed the expected short rate by a risk-premium which 
corresponds exactly to the ‘normal backwardation' of the commodity markets. (Hicks, 1939a, 
p.148) 
 
As Hicks wrote, risk-premiums are part of forward rates: 
… forward short rates … equal expected rates plus a risk-premium. (Hicks, 1939a, p.281n.) 
 
The determination of the long-term rate in Hicks’s thought can be represented in a two 
period’s framework as follow: 𝑅" = [(1 + 𝑟,)(1 + 𝑟" + 𝜌,)],/" − 1  
Where the risk-premium is 𝜌, = 𝑟𝑓, − 𝑟"#  
This brings us to case [2]. 
 
Case [2]: 
 
If the current and expected short-term rates are 𝑟, = 1% and 𝑟𝑓, = 𝑟"# + 𝜌, with 𝑟"# = 1% 
and 𝜌, = 2%, then the long-term rate is 𝑅" = 1.99%. 
If the market supply of long loans increases in comparison with the demand, the risk-premium 
contained in the forward rate would increase from 2% to 3%. The long-term rate could then 
rise up to the level of 𝑅"= = 2.49%. 
Here, the long-term rate of interest would become higher than the average of expected short 
term rates because it would contains a risk-premium.  
Hicks interpreted the spread between forward and expected spot/short rate as a 
“constitutional weakness” on the long side of markets. Borrowers hedge themselves from the 
liquidity risk of borrowing at the short term interest rate	𝑟"#, by contracting at the forward 
rate. And the risk-premium is included in the forward rate. 
To sum up, Hicks’s theory of the term structure of interest rates is different from Keynes’s 
one. Indeed, the risk premium results from the supply of and demand for long and short term 
loans by borrowers and lenders (who are not arbitrageurs), and not only from lenders’ liquidity 
preferences. These preferences engender a natural upward sloping shape of the term 
structure of interest rates in Hicks’s theory, even without introducing arbitragers. 
 
The next (fourth) section shows that risk premiums are, for arbitrageurs, an opportunity to 
make profits. Indeed, according to Hicks: 
 
…the forward market for loans (like the forward market for commodities) may be expected to 
have a constitutional weakness on one side, a weakness which offers an opportunity for 
speculation. (Hicks, 1939a, p.146). 
 
5. The ‘professional investors’ 
 
Hicks, like Keynes, introduces a third kind of agent: the “professional investors” who 
“provide most of the logic of the interest system” (Hicks, 1939a, p.169). These agents are 
“Banks themselves, financial houses, public institutions, large industrial and commercial 
firms” (Hicks, 1939a, p.169). Arbitrageurs can take advantage of the “constitutional weakness” 
of markets for loans without having a preferred-habitat like common lenders or borrowers.  
In this sense, Hicks describes “professional investors” as agents “operating on the whole 
gamut, and paying close attention to small differences in rates” (Hicks, 1939a, p.169)17. They 
are the counterpart of hedgers, and they can be more willing to take risks than common 
lenders on the market for long term maturities: 
 
it is the essence of speculation, as opposed to hedging, that the speculator puts himself 
into a more risky position as a result of his forward trading. (Hicks, 1939a, p.138) 
 
As seen in the previous (third) section, Hicks explains that the equations giving the long term 
rate contains a risk-premium 𝜌, = 𝑟𝑓, − 𝑟"#  because lenders and borrowers have different 
preferences on loan markets. These different preferences are reflected by an expected 
 
17 Hicks compares arbitrageurs on loans markets to “… professional arbitrageurs who provide most of the logic 
of the system of foreign exchange rates.” (Hicks, 1939a, p.169). 
short/spot rate lower than the forward rate.  Given this structure, an operation of arbitrage 
could be to buy long-term bonds at the forward rate (𝑟𝑓) and to borrow at the spot rate (𝑟"#). 
 
We now present Case [3] to illustrate the implication of the operations of arbitrage in 
an economy with primary lenders and borrowers18: 
 
Consider the initial structure of interest rates in the Case [2], where 𝑟, = 1%	and 𝑟"# = 1%. If 
the risk-premium is 2%, 𝑟𝑓" = 3%. This risk-premium reflects an excess supply of long term 
bonds of borrowers – hedging at the forward rate. If the current short/spot rate 𝑟, = 1%, the 
long term rate 𝑅" would be 1.99%. Arbitrageurs could make a profit with the following 
strategy. At date t0, they can issue short term bonds at the short/spot rate of 1%, and expect 
to issue bonds again at date t1 at the expected short/spot rate of 1% in order to buy long term 
bonds at the long term rate of 1.99%. If the amount invested in t0 was 100€, arbitrageurs could 
expect to reimburse 102.01€ and would earn 104.03€ in t2. At this date, arbitrageurs would 
have made a profit of 2.01€. Purchases of long term bonds would lead to an increase of their 
price and then to a drop of the long rate of interest until it reaches the level of 1%, which 
corresponds to the average of current and expected short/spot rates. Therefore, the level of 
the long term rate of interest would have decreased thanks to the operations of arbitrageurs; 
it was initially 𝑅" = 1.99%, and after the occurrence of arbitrages the level of the long term 
rate would be 𝑅"= = 1%.  
 
To sum up, in Hicks’s economic framework, arbitrageurs can eliminate risk premiums 
and therefore, they may bring the long term rate to the average of expected short term rates. 
On loan markets, the level of the long term rate of interest could thus be lower with the 
presence of arbitrageurs than the one prevailing on a market solely composed of primary 
lenders and borrowers. However, Hicks raised concerned about the limits to arbitrage; he 
indeed wrote that “the extent to which changes in short rates are transmitted to long rates” 
is “a point about which we cannot be very optimistic” (Hicks, 1939a, p.262). The limits to 
arbitrages in Keynes and Hicks thought is analyzed in the next chapter of my thesis, called 
 
18 It is important to note that Hicks does never assert that arbitrages eliminate entirely the risk premium, but 
they still have the power to do it. 
« Limits to arbitrage and interest rates: a controversy between Hawtrey, Hicks and Keynes » 
(Brillant, 2015). 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
 Keynes and Hicks stressed in different manners a link between the short-term rate and 
the long term rate of interest. We saw in a first part the functioning of the term structure of 
interest rates in a context of certainty. In such a context, thanks to arbitrages, the long-term 
rate of interest reflects the average of current and expected short-term rates of interest. 
Because the short-term rate of interest is influenced by the central bank, it is a monetary 
phenomenon in Keynes’s thought. Then, in a second and third part, we have considered a 
context of uncertainty. In uncertainty, Keynes’s and Hicks’s view differ on the risk premium. 
According to Keynes, it is the average of expectations on the short-term rate of interest plus 
a risk premium which determines the long-term rate. The risk-premium comes from the 
preferred-habitat of lenders. According to Hicks, the long-term rate of interest is determined 
by the average of current short-term and forward rates. The risk premium is characterized by 
the spread between expected short/spot rates and forward rate. This spread is engendered 
by the preferred habitat of lenders and borrowers and reflects a “constitutional weakness” on 
the market for long maturities. Indeed, the forward rate is higher than the expected 
short/spot rates. Hicks called this situation a “normal backwardation” on loan markets, which 
is characterized by a higher level of forward rates in comparison to expected short/spot rates. 
In the fourth section, we see that Hicks introduced a third kind of agent, the “professional 
investors” (1939a, p.169) who are arbitrageurs. These agents can advantage on spreads 
between expected short/spot rates and forward rates. Indeed, because of the “constitutional 
weakness” of markets associated with the preferred-habitat of lenders and borrowers, 
arbitrageurs can realize profits when expected short/spot rates are lower than forward rates. 
Through these arbitrages, the level of the risk-premium can be reduced. As a consequence, 
the average of current short rate and forward rates diminishes. Therefore, the long-term rate 
of interest falls. 
